by Mark Wade
A U.S. ARMY STUDY FOR THE
A LUNAR OUTPOST
9 JUNE 1959
Proposal to Establish a Lunar Outpost (C)
Chief of Ordnance CRD 20 Mar 1959
1. (U) Reference letter to Chief of Ordnance from Chief of
Research and Development, subject as above.
2. (C) Subsequent to approval by the Chief of Staff of
reference, representatives of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency
indicated that supplementary guidance would be required
concerning the scope of the preliminary investigation specified
in the reference. In particular these representatives requested
guidance concerning the source of funds required to conduct the
3. (S) I envision expeditious development of the proposal to
establish a lunar outpost to be of critical importance to the U.
S. Army of the future. This evaluation is apparently shared by
the Chief of Staff in view of his expeditious approval and
enthusiastic endorsement of initiation of the study. Therefore,
the detail to be covered by the investigation and the subsequent
plan should be as complete as is feasible in the time limits
allowed and within the funds currently available within the
office of the Chief of Ordnance. In this time of limited budget,
additional monies are unavailable. Current programs have been
scrutinized rigidly and identifiable "fat" trimmed away. Thus
high study costs are prohibitive at this time.
4. (C) I leave it to your discretion to determine the source and
the amount of money to be devoted to this purpose.
No contacts with agencies outside the Army will be made until
after the results of the preliminary investigation have been
presented to the Department of the Defense. The findings of the
initial investigation will be made through my office to the
Chief of Staff. No additional distribution will be made and no
public release will be made concerning this project. Because of
the sensitive aspects of this proposal it is essential that this
project not be disclosed prematurely;
5. Your plan of accomplishment should include full utilization
of the other technical services and combat arms to the extent
feasible and necessary. In the accomplishment of this
investigation the Chief of Engineers all be responsible for the
design, constriction, and maintenance of the base and the Chief
Signal Officer will be responsible for communications and other
support for which he is peculiarly qualified. Specific emphasis
should be given to the Army-wide capability to contribute to
this project. The results of this preliminary investigation are
requested by 15 May 1959.
6. Reproductions of this letter to the extent you deem essential
is authorized. All copies will be recorded.
ARTHUR G. TRUDEAU
Lieutenant General, GS
Chief of Research and Development
Requirement for a
There is a requirement
for a manned military outpost on the moon. The lunar outpost is
required to develop and protect potential United States
interests on the moon; to develop techniques in moon-based
surveillance of the earth and space, in communications relay,
and in operations on the surface of the moon; to serve as a base
for exploration of the moon, for further exploration into space
and for military operations on the moon if required; and to
support scientific investigations on the moon.
2. Operational Concept
Initially the outpost
will be of sufficient size and contain sufficient equipment to
permit the survival and moderate constructive activity of a
minimum number of porsonne1 (about 10 - 20) on a sustained
basis. It must be designed for expansion of facilities, resupply,
and rotation of personnel to ensure maximum extension of
sustained occupancy. It should be designed to be self-sufficient
for as long as possible without outside support.
In the location and design of the
base, consideration will be given to operation of a
triangulation station of a moon-to-earth base line space
surveillance system, facilitating communications with and
observation of the earth, facilitating travel between the moon
and the earth, exploration of the moon and further explorations
of space, and to the defence of the base against attack if
The primary objective is to
establish the first permanent manned installation on the moon.
Incidental to this mission drill be the investigation of the
scientific, commercial, and military potential of the moon.
3. Background of Requirement
NSC policy on outer space.
OCB Operations Plan on Outer Space.
b. Reason for Requirement
The national policy on outer space includes the
objective of development and exploiting US outer space
capabilities as needed to achieve scientific, military, and
potential purposes. The OCB Operations Plan to implement
this policy establishes a specific program to obtain
scientific data on space environment out to the vicinity of
the moon, including the moon's gravitational and magnetic
fields and to explore the characteristics of the moon's
surface. There are no known technica1 barriers to the
establishment of a manned installation on the moon.
The establishment of a manned base of operations on the moon
has tremendous military and scientific potential. Because
invaluable scientific, military, and political prestige will
come to the nation that first establishes a lunar base, it
is imperative that the United States be first.
The full extent of the military potential cannot be
predicted, but it is probable that observation of the earth
and space vehicles from the moon will prove to be highly
advantageous. By using a moon-to- earth base line, space
surveillance by triangulation promises great range and
accuracy. The presently contemplated earth-based tracking.,
and control network will be inadequate for the deep space
operations contemplated. Military communications may be
greatly improved by the use of a moon-based relay station.
The employment of moon-based weapons systems against earth
or space targets may prove to be feasible and desirable.
Moon-based military power will
be a strong deterrent to war because of the extreme
difficulty, from the enemy point of view, of eliminating our
ability to retaliate. Any military operations on the moon
will be difficult to counter by the enemy because of the
difficulty of his reaching the moon, if our forces arc
already present and have means of countering a landing or of
neutralizing any hostile forces that have landed. The
situation is reversed if hostile forces are permitted to
arrive first. They can militarily counter our landings and
attempt to deny us politically the use of their property.
The scientific advantages are equally difficult to predict
but are highly promising. Study of the universe, of the
moon, and of the space environment will all be aided by
scientific effort on the moon. Perhaps the most promising
scientific advantage is the usefulness of a moon base for
further explorations into space. Materials on the moon
itself may prove to be valuable and commercially
4. Organizational Concept
The establishment of the
outpost should be a special project having authority and
priority similar to the Manhattan Project in World War II. Once
established, the lunar base will be operated under the control
of a unified space command. Space, or certainly that portion of
outer space encompassing the earth and the moon, will be
considered a military theatre. The control of all United States
military forces by unified commands is already established and
military operations in space should be no exception.
A unified space command should
control and utilize, besides the lunar base, operationa1
military satellites and space vehicles, space surveillance
systems, and the logistical support thereof. Other space
commands might be organized as our operations extended to
5. Degree of Urgency
To be second to the
Soviet Union in establishing an outpost on the moon would be
disastrous to our nation's prestige and in turn to our
democratic philosophy. Although it is contrary to United States
policy, the Soviet Union in establishing the first permanent
base, may claim the moon or critical areas thereof for its own.
Then a subsequent attempt to
establish an outpost by the United States might be considered
and propagandized as a hostile act. The Soviet Union in
propaganda broadcasts has announced the 50th anniversary of the
present government (1967) will be celebrated by Soviet citizens
on the moon. The National Space policy intelligence estimate is
that the Soviets could land on the moon by 1968.
6. Maintenance and Supply
The maintenance and
supply effort to support a lunar base will be high by present
standards. Continued delivery of equipment and means of survival
will be required and each delivery will be costly. Every
conceivable solution for minimizing the logistic effort must be
Maximum use of any oxygen or power
source on the moon through regenerative or other techniques must
be exploited. Means of returning safely to earth must be
available to the occupants of the outpost.
7. Training and Personnel
The number of personnel
on the base itself trill be quite small, at least initially, but
the total number of personnel supporting the effort may be quite
large. Until further study is made a realistic qualitative and
quantitative personnel estimate cannot be provided.
The training requirements of
earth-based support personnel would resemble those of personnel
in long range ballistic missile units and radar tracking
systems. For the relatively small number of personnel actually
transported to the moon base training requirements would be
exacting in many fields.
8. Additional Items and
A complete family of
requirements and supporting research and development projects
will be necessary to develop all of the supporting equipment to
establish a lunar base. Very high thrust boosters, space
vehicles, intermediate space stations, space dwellings, clothing
and consumable supplies will have to be developed.
SUMMARY AND SUPPORTING CONSIDERATIONS
(S) CHAPTER I:
HORIZON is the project whose
objective is the establishment of a lunar outpost by the United
States. This study was directed by letter dated 20 March 1959,
from the Chief of R&D, Department of the Army, to the Chief of
Ordnance. Responsibility for the preparation of the study was
subsequently assigned to the Commanding General, Army Ordnance
Elements of all Technical Services
of the Army participated in the investigation. This report is a
limited feasibility study which investigates the methods and
means of accomplishing this objective and the purposes it will
serve. It also considers the substantial political, scientific
and security implications which the prompt establishment of a
lunar outpost will have for the United States.
1. The Broad Requirement
The US national policy on space includes the objective
of developing and exploiting this nation's space capability
as necessary to achieve national political, scientific, and
security objectives. The establishment of a manned outpost
in the lunar environment will demonstrate United States
leadership in space. It will also provide a basis for
further explorations and operations on the lunar surface as
well as a supporting capability for other US operations in
2. Purpose of the Lunar Outpost
The establishment of a manned US outpost on the moon
Demonstrate the United
States scientific leadership in outer space
explorations and investigations.
Extend and improve space
reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities and control
Extend and improve
communications and serve as a communications relay
Provide a basic and
supporting research laboratory for space research and
Develop a stable,
low-gravity outpost for use as a launch site for deep
Provide an opportunity for
scientific exploration and development of a space
mapping and survey system.
Provide an emergency staging
area, rescue capability or navigational aid for other
3. A Realistic Objective
Advances in propulsion, electronics, space medicine and
other astronautical sciences are taking place at an
explosive rate. As recently as 1949, the first penetration
of space war accomplished by the US when a two-stage V-2
rocket reached the then unbelievable altitude of 250 miles.
In 1957, the Soviet Union placed the first man-made
satellite in orbit. Since early l958, when the first US
earth satellite was launched, both the US and USSR have
launched additional satellites, moon probes, and
successfully recovered animals sent into space in missiles.
In 1960, and thereafter, there
will be other deep space probes by the US and the USSR, with
the US planning to place the first man into space with a
REDSTONE missile, followed in 1961 with the first man in
orbit. However, the Soviets could very well place a man in
space before we do. In addition, instrumented lunar landings
probably will be accomplished by 1964 by both the United
States and the USSR. As will be indicated in the technical
discussions of this report, the first US manned lunar
landing could be accomplished by 1965. Thus, it appears that
the establishment of an outpost on the moon is a capability
which can be accomplished.
4. Scientific Implications
A wealth of scientific data can be obtained from
experiments conducted at a lunar outpost. Without doubt, the
scientific community will generate many new and unique
applications as man's actual arrival on the moon draws
nearer reality. The very absence of knowledge about the moon
and outer space is scientific justification to attempt to
breach this void of human understanding.
It is to be expected that civilian efforts to advance
science for the sake of science will parallel the military
efforts. It is also expected that the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration will treat those subjects in
greater detail than is either possible or desirable in this
study, and that such action will further strengthen the
requirement for the earliest possible establishment of an
5. Political Implications
The political implications of our failure to be first in
space are a matter of public record. This failure has
reflected adversely on United States scientific and
political leadership. To some extent we have recovered the
loss. However, once having been second best in the eyes of
the world's population, we are not now in a position to
afford being second on any other major step in space.
However, the political implications of being second in space
activities accomplished to date have not been nearly as
serious as those which could result from failure to be the
first in establishing a manned lunar outpost.
The results of failure to first place man on an
extra-terrestrial base will raise grave political questions
and at the same time lower US prestige and influence. The
Soviet Union has announced openly its intention that some of
its citizens will celebrate the 50th anniversary of the
October Revolution (1967) on the moon. The US intelligence
community agrees that the Soviet Union may accomplish a
manned lunar landing at any time after 1965. Judging from
past experience, it is not difficult to visualize all manner
of political and legal implications which the Soviet Union
might postulate as a result of such a successful
accomplishment nor the military advantages it might achieve
6. Security Implications
The extent to which future operations might be conducted
in space, to include the land mass of the moon or perhaps
other planets, is of such a magnitude as to almost defy the
imagination. In both Congressional and military examination
of the problem, it is generally agreed that the interactions
of space and terrestrial war are so great as to generate
radically new concepts.
Admittedly, the security significance of the moon, per se,
in the context of offensive and defensive operations, is a
matter for conjecture at this time. From the viewpoint of
national security, the primary implications of the
feasibility of establishing a lunar outpost is the
importance of being first. Clearly the US would not be in a
position to exercise an option between peaceful and military
applications unless we are first. In short, the
establishment of the initial lunar outpost is the first
definitive step in exercising our options.
Unquestionably, there are other applications of space (i.
e. reconnaissance, meteorology, communications) which will
permit an earlier attainment of meaningful accomplishments
and demonstrate US interest in space. Individually, however,
these accomplishments will not have the same political
impact that a manned lunar outpost could have on the world.
In the still vague body of fact and thought on the subject,
world opinion may view the other applications similar to
action on the high seas, but will view the establishment of
a first lunar outpost as similar to proprietary rights
derived from first occupancy.
As the Congress has noted, we
are caught in a stream in which we have no choice but to
proceed. Our success depends on the decisiveness with which
we exercise our current options. The lunar outpost is the
most immediate case. It is the basis for other more
far-reaching actions, such as further interplanetary
Four major conclusions summarize the more detailed deductions
which may be drawn from the entire report:
Political, scientific, and
security considerations indicate that it is imperative for
the United States to establish a lunar outpost at the
earliest practicable date.
Project HORIZON represents the
earliest feasible capability for the U. S. to establish a
By its implementation, the
United States can establish an operational lunar outpost by
late 1966, with the initial manned landings to have taken
place in the spring of 1965.
The importance of an early decision
to proceed with the program. coupled with adequate funding, must
be clearly understood Inordinate delay will have two inescapable
The program's ultimate
accomplishment will be delayed, thus forfeiting the change
of defeating the USSR in a race which is already openly
recognized as such throughout the world.
Delayed initiation, followed
later by a crash program, which would likely be precipitated
by evidence of substantial Soviet progress in a lunar
outpost program, will not only lose the advantage of
timeliness but also will inevitably involve significantly
higher costs and lower reliability. The establishment of a
U. S. lunar outpost will require very substantial funding
whether it is undertaken now or ten years hence. There are
no developments projected for the predictable future which
will provide order of magnitude type price reductions.
The U. S. Army possesses the
capability of making significant contributions in all aspects of
such a program.
D. ORGANIZATION AND CONTENT OF THE
The Project HORIZON report has been divided into two volumes,
which are entitled as follows:
Volume I is, as indicated, a
document which gives a short summary of the other volume, a
discussion of non-technical considerations, and a resume of the
resources and facilities of the Army Technical Services which
can lend support to this program.
Volume II is a technical investigation of the problem. It
includes practical preliminary concepts for all elements of the
program and. in many cases, relates actual hardware available
from current programs to the solution of specific problems. It
includes a broad development approach and a funding breakout by
fiscal year. Also included are personnel and training
requirements for all segments of the operation together with the
policy of the US with respect to space and the legal implication
of a lunar outpost. This volume was prepared by a unique working
group, comprised of a special segment of the Future Projects
Design Branch of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA), which
was augmented by highly qualified representatives of each of the
eleven Technical Services of the Army.
These representatives were carefully
selected for the specific task and, during the course of the
study, became resident members of the aforementioned ABMA group.
The resident representatives or the Technical Services were
supported by their respective services with a group of the
highest caliber specialists who were made available exclusively
to support the project. Thus, it is believed that the depth of
experience, knowledge, and judgment brought to bear on the
problem by this group is commensurate with the task of
accomplishing the report objectives.
Throughout the preparation of the entire report, and especially
within this technical volume, the guiding philosophy has been
one of enlightened conservatism of technical approach. Briefly
stated, this philosophy dictates that one must vigorously pursue
research to "advance the state-of-the-art?', but that paramount
to successful major systems design is a conservative approach
which requires that no item be more "advanced" than required to
do the job. It recognizes that an unsophisticated success is of
vastly greater importance than a series of advanced and highly
sophisticated failures that "almost worked. " Established
engineering principals, used in conjunction with the best
available design parameters, have been applied throughout in
order to remove the elements of science fiction and unrealistic
(S) CHAPTER II:
TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND PLANS
A. OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY
This part of the study presents applicable technical information
which substantiates the feasibility of the expedited establishment
of a lunar outpost, and it relates U. S. capabilities and
developments to the accomplishment of the task It is comprehensive
in its scope, covering the design criteria and requirements for all
major elements of the program including the lunar outpost, the
earth-lunar transportation system, the necessary communications
systems and the considerable earth support facilities and their
The technical assumptions concerning
design parameters for this program are realistic yet conservative.
Likewise, the assumptions which concern the scope and magnitude of
other U. S. programmes which will support HORIZON are reasonable and
in line with current and projected programs.
B. RESUME OF THE TECHNICAL PROGRAM
The basic carrier vehicles for Project HORIZON will be the SATURN I
and II. The SATURN I, currently being developed under an ARPA order,
will be fully operational by October 1963. The SATURN II, which is
an outgrowth of the SATURN I program, could be developed during the
period 1962-1964. The SATURN II will utilize improved engines in the
booster and oxygen/hydrogen engines in all of its upper stages.
By the end of 1964, a total of 72 SATURN vehicles should have been
launched in U. S. programmes, of which 40 are expected to contribute
to the accomplishment of HORIZON. Cargo delivery to the moon begins
in January 1965. The first manned landing by two men will be made in
April 1965. The build-up and construction phase will be continued
without interruption until the outpost is ready for beneficial
occupancy and is manned by a task force of 12 men in November 1966.
This build-up program requires 61 SATURN I and 88 SATURN II
launchings through November 1966, the average launching rate being
5. 3 per month. During this period some 490,000 pounds of useful
cargo will be transported to the moon
During the first operational year of the lunar outpost, December
1966 through 1967, a total of 64 launchings have been scheduled
These will result in an additional 266,000 pounds of useful cargo on
The total cost of the eight and one-half year program presented in
this study is estimated to be six billion dollars. This is an
average of approximately $700 million per year. These figured are a
valid appraisal, and, while preliminary, they represent the best
estimates of experienced, non-commercial, agencies of the
government. Substantial funding is undeniably required for the
establishment of a U. S. lunar outpost; however, the implications of
the future importance of such an operation should be compared to the
fact that the average annual funding required for Project HORIZON
would be less than two percent of the current annual defense budget.
The lunar outpost proposed for Project HORIZON is a permanent
facility capable of supporting a complement of 12 men engaged in a
continuing operation The design of the outpost installation herein
is based on realistic requirements and capabilities, and is not an
attempt to project so far into the future as to lose reality. The
result has been a functional and reliable approach upon which men
can stake their lives with confidence of survival.
The exact location of the outpost site cannot be determined
until an exploratory probe and mapping program has been
completed. However, for a number of technical reasons, such as
temperature and rocket vehicle energy requirements, the area
bounded by +-20 deg latitude/longitude of the optical centre of
the moon seems favourable. Within this area, three particular
sites have been chosen which appear to meet the more detailed
requirements of landing space, surface conditions,
communications, and proximity to varied lunar "terrain".
A rather extensive lunar mapping program is already underway in
order to satisfy existing requirements in Astro-Geodesy. Maps to
a scale of 1:5,000,000 and 1:1,000,000 are planned for
completion by December 1960 and August 1962, respectively.
Larger scale mapping will then be undertaken for several
specific site selections.
2.. Design Criteria
The design of the lunar outpost facilities will, of course,
be dominated by the influence of two factors - the lunar
environment and the space transportation system capabilities. A
few of the more pronounced primary lunar environmental
parameters are listed below:
Essentially no atmosphere.
Surface gravity approximately
1/6 earth gravity.
Radius of approximately 1000
miles is about 1/4 that of earth. (This results in a
significant shortening of the horizon as compared to Earth.
Surface temperature variations
between it lunar day and night of + 248 deg F to - 202 deg
Maximum subsurface temperature
at equator is -40 deg F.
These and many other unfamiliar
environmental conditions require that every single item which is
to be placed on the lunar surface have a design which is
compatible with these phenomena. However, a careful
determination has been made of man's requirements to live in
this environment, and it appears that there is no area which
cannot be adequately solved within the readily available
3. Outpost Facilities and Their Installation
The first two men will arrive on the lunar surface in April
1965. They will be guided to an area in which the cargo build-up
for future construction has already begun. Their landing vehicle
will have an immediate return-to-earth capability; however, it
is intended that they remain in the area until after the arrival
of the advance party of the construction crew. During their
stay, they will live in the cabin of their lunar vehicle which
will be provided with necessary life essentials and power
supplies. For an extended stay, these will be augmented by
support from cargo previously and subsequently delivered to the
site by other vehicles.
The mission of the original two men will be primarily one of
verification of previous unmanned environmental investigations
and confirmation of the site selection and cargo delivery.
Figure I-1 shows the HORIZON outpost as it would appear in late
1965, after about six months of construction effort. The basic
building block for the outpost will be cylindrical metal tanks
ten feet in diameter and 20 feet in length. (Details of typical
tanks are shown in Fig. I-2.) The buried cylindrical tanks at
the left-centre of Fig, I-1 constitute the living quarters of
the initial construction crew of nine men who will arrive in
July 1965, (Details in Fig. I-3.)
During the construction period, this force will be gradually
augmented until a final complement of 12 men is reached. The
construction camp is a minimum facility and will be made
operational within 15 days after the beginning of active work at
the outpost site. Two nuclear reactors are located in holes as
shown in the left portion of Fig. I-1. These provide power for
the operation of the preliminary quarters and for the equipment
used in the construction of the permanent facility. The main
quarters and supporting facilities are shown being assembled in
the open excavation to the right-centre of the figure. These
cylinders will also ultimately be covered with lunar material.
Empty cargo and propellant
containers have been assembled and are being used for storage of
bulk supplies, weapons, and life essentials such as insulated
oxygen/nitrogen tanks. Two typical surface vehicles are shown:
one is a construction vehicle for lifting, digging, scraping,
etc.; the other is a transport vehicle for more extended
distance trips needed for hauling, reconnaissance, rescue, and
the like. In the left background, a lunar landing vehicle is
settling on the surface. A lightweight parabolic antenna has
been erected near the main quarters to provide communications
The basic completed outpost is shown in Fig, I-4. Significant
additions beyond the items illustrated in Fig. I-1 are two
additional nuclear power supplies, cold storage facility, and
the conversion of the original construction camp quarters to a
bio-science and physics-science laboratory.
A number of factors influenced the decision to locate the main
structures beneath the surface. Among these were the uniform
temperature available (approximately -40 deg F), protection from
meteoroids, security, good insulating properties of the lunar
material, and radiation protection. Each of the quarters and
cylinders will be a special double-walled "thermos bottle type"
vacuum tank with a special insulating material in the space
between the walls. (Vacuum is usually maintained simply by
venting the tank to the lunar void. ) Despite the ambient
subsurface temperature of -40 deg F, the heat losses from these
special tanks will be remarkably low. Investigations show that
the incidental heat given off by an adequate internal lighting
system will nominally supply essentially all of the heat
required to maintain comfortable "room" temperature in the
A suitable atmosphere will be provided within the quarters. The
basic gas supply will stem from special insulated tanks
containing liquid oxygen or nitrogen The nitrogen supply needs
only to provide for initial pressurization and replacement of
leakage losses; whereas, the oxygen is, of course, continuously
used to supply bodily needs. However, the weights and volumes of
both gases are quite reasonable and present no unusual problem
of supply. Carbon dioxide and moisture will be controlled
initially by a solid chemical absorbent and dehumidifier. Such a
scheme requires considerable amounts of material; therefore, a
carbon dioxide freeze-out system will be installed later.
4. Personnel Equipment
For sustained operation on the lunar surface a body
conformation suit having a substantial outer metal surface is
considered a necessity for several reasons: (1) uncertainty that
fabrics and elastomers can sustain sufficient pressure
differential without unacceptable leakage; (2) meteoroid
protection; (3) provides a highly reflective surface; (4)
durability against abrasive lunar surface; (5) cleansing and
sterilization. Figure I-5 shows a cutaway and "buttoned up"
concept for such a suit. It should be borne in mind that while
movement and dexterity are severe problems in suit design, the
earth weight of the suit can be allowed to be relatively
substantial. For example, if a man and his lunar suit weigh 300
pounds on earth, they will only weigh 50 pounds on the moon
A comprehensive program will be undertaken to provide special
hand tools, load-handling gear, and dining equipment to meet the
unusual requirements. Initially, all food will be pre-cooked;
however, as water supplies increase with the introduction of a
reclaiming system, dehydrated and fresh-frozen foods will be
used., Early attention will be given to hydroponics culture of
salads and the development of other closed-cycle food product
5. Environmental Research
In order to corroborate essential environmental data, a
series of unmanned experiments are planned. There are early data
requirements in the areas of radiation, meteoroid impacts,
temperatures, magnetic field, surface conditions, ionization,
radio propagation and biological effects.
D. SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
1. Flight Mechanics
In choosing appropriate trajectories to use in this program,
one must strike a balance between the low-energy paths and the
high energy curves. The low energy trajectories give the highest
payload capability, but are sensitive to small variations in the
injection conditions and can also lead to unacceptably long
transit times. The higher energy trajectories are faster and are
not as sensitive to deviations in the injection conditions, but
they result in payload penalties and higher terminal velocities
which in turn require greater braking energy at the termination
of the trip.
A good compromise appears to be a
trajectory which will yield a transit time from earth to moon of
approximately 50 to 60 hours. Several different trajectory
schemes will be used in Project HORIZON. They include
trajectories for transit: (1) direct from the earth to the moon,
(2) direct from earth to a 96-minute (307 nautical mile
altitude) orbit of the earth, (3) from this 96-minute earth
orbit to the moon, and (4) direct from the moon to earth. In
addition, there are special considerations for the terminal
phase of each type trajectory.
Figure I-6 illustrates the two basic schemes of transporting man
and cargo from earth to the moon.
The first scheme (1 above) is the direct approach, that is, a
vehicle would depart the earth's surface and proceed directly to
the lunar surface using a retro-rocket or landing stage for the
final landing manoeuvre. Since the moon has no appreciable
atmosphere, a rocket type propulsion system will be required for
the landing. The second scheme (2 and 3 above) shown is that for
proceeding first into an earth orbit and later departing the
orbit for the flight to the lunar surface, again using a landing
stage. In either scheme, the flight time from the earth or earth
orbit to the moon will be the same.
The direct scheme, which is the most straightforward, has two
advantages: first, it offered the shortest flight time from the
earth's surface to the lunar surface since an orbital stopover
is not required.
In the orbital scheme, much larger payloads can be transported
into orbit, assuming the vehicle size to be constant, and by
accumulating payloads in orbit, it is possible to transport a
payload to the moon on the order of ten times (and more if
desired) the capability of a single vehicle flying directly to
To illustrate this point, it has been assumed in the study that
the. first men arriving on the moon will be provided with an
immediate return capability. Figure I-7 depicts the vehicular
requirements for the two schemes.
The direct approach would require a six stage vehicle with a
lift-off thrust of 12 million pounds, as compared to a
two-million-pound thrust vehicle for the orbital schemes. By
placing the upper stage and payload of two-million-pound thrust
vehicle into orbit, and with additional vehicles as shown,
performing a fuel transfer and checkout operation, the same
mission, that of transporting two men to the moon and returning
them to earth, could be accomplished.
It should be pointed out, however, that if the United States is
to have a manned lunar outpost by 1966, and at the same time
provide the first men arriving on the moon with the desired
return capability, the orbital approach is mandatory, since a
12-million pound thrust vehicle will not be available to meet
the required schedule.
For the return to earth, from either the earth orbit or the
lunar surface, aerodynamic braking will be used, since it allows
significant overall payload increases when compared to rocket
braking. The aerodynamic braking body used for this study is
similar in shape to a JUPITER missile nose cone modified by the
addition of movable drag vanes at the base of the cone. Though
the size varies, the same basic shape was considered for use
from the lunar surface to earth act as for use from the
96-minute orbit to the earth's surface. Studies show that,
within acceptable limits of entry angle, the vehicle can make a
successful descent which is well within the physical tolerances
imposed by man's presence, and which can be guided with
acceptable accuracy for final recovery. The recent successful
flight and subsequent recovery of two primates aboard a nose
cone further substantiates the validity of this approach to
earth return braking. This test vehicle was fired to IRBM range
and, due to the steep re-entry angle, the decelerative forces r·
associated with this operation were many times greater than
expected for project HORIZON trajectories.
2. Orbital Carrier and Space Vehicles
Only two basic carrier vehicles are required to carry out
Project HORIZON - SATURN I and a further development, SATURN II.
The SATURN I vehicle, shown in Figs. I-8 and I-9 consists of a
clustered booster with a lift-off thrust of 1,504, 000 pounds, a
twin engine second stage of about 360,000 pounds of thrust, and
a lox / hydrogen (O2/H2) third stage of 30,000 pounds of thrust.
The initial performance of this vehicle will enable it to place
30,000 pounds of net payload in a 96-minute orbit and 7,500
pounds of net payload to earth escape velocity. It will be
powered by eight North American H-l engines which are a greatly
simplified version of the engine used in JUPITER, THOR, and
ATLAS. The second stage is a modified version of the TITAN
booster. The third stage is a modified CENTAUR vehicle currently
under development by Pratt & Whitney and Convair.
The SATURN II vehicle (Fig. I-10 and I-11) is based on a
modified SATURN I booster. The North American H-1 engines of the
original version will be replaced by H-2 engines which will
up-rate the total thrust by 1/3 to a sea level value of
2,000,000 pounds. The second stage will incorporate two
500,000-pound thrust O2/H2 engines, a third stage will utilise
two 100,000-pound thrust O2/H2 engines, a fourth stage will use
one such engine. Present feasibility studies indicate a SATURN
II payload capability of 70,000 pounds into a 96minute orbit
using three stages and 26,750 pounds to earth escape velocity
using four stages. The development of such a vehicle will
provide the nation a near-optimum vehicle for the utilisation of
the SATURN booster. The prime requirement for the development of
such a vehicle is an expansion of current high-energy O2/H2
engine programs to include development of 100 K and 500 K
As mentioned earlier, 6,000 pounds of useful cargo can be
soft-landed on the moon with the direct method. As presented
herein, only cargo will be transported in this manner, although
there is a discussion of how personnel could also be transported
to and from the moon utilising the direct method. The second
form of conveyance requires two steps. Initially the required
payloads, which will consist of one main lunar rocket vehicle
and several additional propellant tankers, will be placed in a
96-minute orbit of the earth. At this time, the propellants in
orbit will be transferred to the main lunar rocket vehicle.
Figure I-12 is a conceptual view of the operations in the
equatorial earth orbit. The operation in orbit is principally
one of propellant transfer and is not as assembly job. The
vehicle being fuelled is the third stage of a SATURN II with a
lunar landing and return vehicle attached. The third stage of
the SATURN II was used in bringing the combination into orbit
and has thus expended its propellants. This stage is fuelled in
orbit by a crew of approximately ten men after which the vehicle
then proceeds on to the moon. It is planned to send all
personnel and approximately 1/3 of the cargo to the moon by the
Using this orbital system, individual payloads of 48,000 pounds
may be soft-landed on the moon. This value is especially
significant, since it represents the approximate minimum weight
required for a complete earth return vehicle, which is already
assembled and loaded with propellants and is capable of
returning several men. Thus, in order to provide a pre-assembled
return vehicle on the lunar surface during the time frame under
consideration, it is mandatory to go through an initial earth
orbit. In addition to providing a large individual payload
capability, the orbital transportation system offers other
important advantages. Among these are that the total number of
firings to deliver the same amount of payload to the moon is
less and payloads may be fired for orbital rendezvous at any
given pass every day of the month. This alleviates the launch
site scheduling problems which are associated with the
restricted firing times of direct flights.
There are two versions of the lunar landing vehicle. The first
type will be used for direct trips from earth to the lunar
surface. This vehicle has a gross weight of 26,150 pounds and
will soft land some 6,000 pounds of payload. The second vehicle
will be used for flights via orbit. It will have a gross weight
of 140,000 pounds which gives it a capability of soft landing
approximately 48,000 pounds of payload on the moon. Each type of
vehicle will have suitable payload compartments to accomplish
different mission requirements. The lunar landing vehicle shown
in Fig. I-13 has an earth return vehicle as a payload. For such
return vehicle payloads, the structure of the expended braking
stage will serve as a launching platform when it is time to
begin the return journey to earth.
To sustain the orbital station crew and to provide for their
safe return to earth, an orbital return vehicle such as shown in
Fig. I-14 will be provided. This vehicle may be used in
conjunction with another established United States orbital
station, or it may be used as a basis for a minimum orbital
station needed to support Project HORIZON. It is capable of
carrying from 10 to 16 men. It will be carried into orbit by a
SATURN I during the first part of the program and replaced by a
SATURN II in 1967.
3. Guidance and Control
An investigation of the guidance problems concerned with
Project HORIZON indicates that the necessary accuracies and
reliabilities can be met by adaptations, combination and slight
extensions of known and available guidance hardware and
techniques. Final injection velocity, which marks the beginning
of the coast phase of the trajectory to the moon, will be
controlled by conventional means. Mid-course guidance will
assure that the lunar landing vehicle would come within
approximately 20 km (11 nautical miles) of the selected point.
The terminal guidance system, which would be target oriented,
would reduce the three standard deviation error at landing to
approximately 1.5 km.
E. TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM INTEGRATION
The development and integration of the space carriers to support
HORIZON have been carefully outlined and various considerations as
to compatibility, size, development schedule, and overall mission
have been included and discussed in detail in Volume II.
Personnel space transportation requirements to support HORIZON are
shown on Pig. I-15. By the end of 1967 some 252 persons will have
been transported into an earth orbit, 42 will have continued to the
moon, and 26 will have returned from the moon. The orbital station
strength is approximately ten; however, the crew will be rotated
every several months. The space transportation system will deliver
some 756, 000 pounds of useful cargo to the lunar surface by the end
of 1967. In order to accomplish this, 229 SATURN vehicle firings
will be required. A schedule of launching and the broad mission
assigned each vehicle is shown in Fig. I-16. It should be noted
that, due to the savings incurred by the booster recovery system
which will be used, the total number of SATURN boosters required to
support the program is not 229 but only 73.
F. COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRONICS
The communications required for Project HORIZON are logically
divided into an earth-based and lunar-based complex. Each of these
complexes may be considered as having two functions - communications
and surveillance. Of particular significance for the earth-based
complex is the 24-hour communications satellite system presently
under development; As illustrated in Fig. I-17 such a system will
provide the capability of constant communications with both space
vehicles in transit and the lunar outpost.
In addition to the 24-hour communications satellite system, the
current development program of a world-wide surveillance net will
provide space surveillance for the United States during the 1960
era. The basic hardware and techniques used in this net are directly
applicable to HORIZON. Figure I-18 illustrates schematically how
such a world net station could be expanded to support HORIZON by the
addition of two additional 85-foot antennas and other equipment.
Communications on the lunar surface will pose special problems due
in a large part to the lack of atmosphere and the relatively high
curvature of the surface. However, careful investigation reveals no
problems which cannot be solved by an appropriate research program.
In a number of areas, current developments appear almost directly
applicable; for example, the small helmet-mounted radio currently in
production and troop use. A micro-miniaturised version of this,
presently in advanced development, will provide a basis for personal
communication between individuals clad in lunar suits. As the lunar
outpost expands, radio relay stations will extend the radio horizon
as conceived in Figure 1-19.
In addition to voice communication between members of the lunar
party, a number of other electronic devices will be used at the
outpost, These include TV receipt and transmission, transmission of
still photographs, homing and location devices, instantaneous
self-contained emergency communications packs (for distress signals
to earth), infrared detectors, and radar detectors.
G. LAUNCH SITE
A survey was made to determine the adequacy of the Atlantic Missile
Range and Pacific Missile Range for the accomplishment of Project
HORIZON. The results of this survey indicated that, all things being
considered, neither site was suitable. Since a new launch site will
be required, a study was made to determine the optimum location and
requirements for such a site.
The results of this study are discussed in detail in Volume II and
illustrated in Fig. I-20. A total of eight launch pads are required.
This facility will support the requirements of HORIZON and would
also provide additional capacity for other United States programmes.
The equatorial location of the new launch site would provide very
real advantages in terms of payload capability, guidance simplicity,
and operational launching schedules in terms of increased latitude
of appropriate firing times. Two sites stand out when compared to
others: Brazil and Christmas Island. Both of these locations appear
feasible; however, more detailed criteria will have to be
established to make the best choice. Cost and early availability may
ultimately be the governing factors. It is emphasised that site
acquisition and initiation of launch site construction is one of the
most critical items in the program with respect to lead-time. For
the purposes of this study it has been assumed that the Brazil site
would be used.
H. PROGRAM LOGISTICS
The logistic support for Project HORIZON has been studied in overall
scope as well as detailed investigations of specific areas such as
manufacturing considerations, transportation considerations,
personnel, and personnel training.
The results of the studies show very clearly that military
participation in the logistic portion for Project HORIZON is not
only desirable, but mandatory. No attempt has been made to determine
the level of military participation since such items as the
world-wide political situation will play an important part in the
I. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Project HORIZON has been divided into six phases which include R&D
as well as the operational aspects of the overall program. The
schedule for each phase is illustrated on Fig. I-21 and discussed
Phase I - The initial
feasibility study was completed on 9 June 1959 and is
contained in this two volume report.
Phase II - The detailed
development and funding plan will require a more detailed
study with limited experimentation. This phase will require
approximately eight months to complete and will cost $ 5.4
Phase III - The hardware
development and system integration phase constitutes the
majority of the development effort. In Phase III all:
transportation, communication outpost, etc.)
Sub-systems (space vehicles,
communications, ground and relay stations, etc.)
Components (rocket engines,
communication transmitters & receivers, etc.)
Schemes and procedures
(orbital rendezvous, orbital fuel transfer, etc.)
required to accomplish the project objectives will be
Phase IV - The construction of
the lunar outpost involves the utilisation of the systems
and procedures developed in Phase III and is in actuality an
operational phase of the program. The completion of this
phase will accomplish the initial objective of the program:
"establish a manned lunar outpost. "
Phase V - The initial period of
outpost operation will begin in December 1966 and will
constitute the first completely operational phase of the
Phase VI- The expansion of
initial outpost operational capabilities could begin at any
time after December 1966. For the purpose of this study it
has been assumed to begin in January 1968.
1. Basic and Supporting Research
The importance of a strong basic and supporting research effort
in support of a project of this nature cannot be overstated.
Typical areas requiring attention are food and oxygen, clothing,
chemical, biological, radiological bio-medical, vacuum
conditions, weightlessness, meteoroids, lunar-based systems,
moon mapping, explosives in lunar environment, power generation,
material and lubricants, liquid hydrogen production and
handling, and lunar "soil" mechanics.
2. Project HORIZON Development Program
As mentioned above, a strong basic and supporting research
program will be required to accomplish the HORIZON development
program, and ultimately the project objectives. The development
program for this project is basically covered by the first three
phases of the project outlined above, the first of which has
been completed. Phase II, the next step in the development
program, must be accomplished in the time scale indicated in
Fig. I-21 if the United States is to succeed in establishing the
first lunar outpost. The development plan, generated in Phase II
will spell out in considerable detail the developments required
in Phase III, as well as requirements for later phases.
Basically, Phase III will be the development portion of the
project. During this phase, al1 development required to
accomplish the project objectives will be satisfied.
3. Research and Development Facilities
Several unique facilities will be required to support
HORIZON. Figure I-22 is a view of a large lunar environmental
simulator which will provide a capability for research,
development, testing and training for HORIZON as well as other
projects in the national space program. Figure 1-23 illustrates
a space flight simulator which will provide for research and
training of effects associated with boost acceleration,
coasting, weightlessness, and braking deceleration. In addition,
medical research facility is located in conjunction with this
III: MANAGEMENT AND PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
A. SCOPE OF OPERATIONS
Having developed a requirement for the establishment of a
manned lunar outpost, we may discuss the operational concepts
and facilities necessary to fulfil that requirement. From these,
an organisational structure can be evolved. The treatment of the
technical concepts and facilities in this chapter will be
limited to that detail absolutely necessary to establishment of
an organisational / operational structure.
2. Terrestrial Launch Site
In order to accomplish any space mission, a terrestrial
launch site will be required. Use of any of the existing sites
controlled by the United States has several disadvantages. Among
there is the fact that all of these bases are geographically
located as to limit firing times to but a few days each month
and to require wasteful expenditure of available energy to
achieve success. This latter results from the fact that none of
the existing launch sites are located close to the equator.
Furthermore, once human beings are
either placed in orbit or dispatched on planetary missions,
there can be no interfering problems regarding scheduling of
firings, either regular or emergency; physical space
difficulties resulting from supply build-up or other logistic
considerations, etc. The terrestrial launch elite is expected to
evolve into an operational complex supporting both continued R&D
and firing by operational units with orbital or other space
missions. Existing United States launching complexes are devoted
primarily to R&D firings of weapons systems. Most such complexes
are rapidly becoming saturated with such firings in the confines
of their present areas. It rapidly becomes evident that a
separate site will be required in order to support this national
space effort in a more economical manner.
There are a great many factors involved in this requirement.
They are discussed at length in Chapter V. Three major factors
influencing requirements are:
Operational need for having an
orbital station in an equatorial orbit to simplify the
High payload penalty and
complexity of trajectory problem involved in "dog-legging"
into equatorial orbit from a non-equatorial launch site.
Magnitude of effort required to
implement the objectives of this operation.
In addition, of course, there are
other factors influencing the attainment of such a site. For
Diplomatic and political
implications involved at some suitable sites.
Military vulnerability and
security requirements at all suitable sites. (These are
relative choices not necessarily with the best diplomatic or
political choice. )
Cost: It may be reasonably assumed
here, based on the above mentioned factors and detailed
technical considerations in Volume II that an equatorial launch
site will be selected. It will be the terrestrial site from
which this nation dispatches its first man destined to set foot
on the lunar surface. This site will provide a capability to
conduct additional space missions in fulfilment of other
For this site to be operational in sufficient time, action is
demanded immediately in negotiations required for acquisition.
Build-up of facilities must begin at an early date in order to
meet the desired operational readiness date.
A terrestrial launch site, which supports the lunar outpost
project during the early technical effort, should also support
it during the operational phase. There will be practical
requirements for the utilisation of the launch site for other
projects possibly involving military R&D, military operations,
and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Practical
problems thus raised are subsequently treated under
3. Orbital Station
In order to successfully accomplish lunar soft landings in
the time frame under consideration, firings may be undertaken
either directly from the earth's surface to the destination or
by means of on intermediate station in orbit about the earth.
The former approach requires the expenditure of tremendous
amount of energy for relatively small payloads. Therefore, it
cannot provide an immediate return capability in the proposed
time frame, using the boosters then available. Under those
conditions, the orbital station, providing larger payloads and
immediate, emergency, return capability from the moon is the
most desirable choice for transport of personnel.
During early transit operations through the orbital station,
facilities in orbit will be on a minimum essential austere
basis. It will have rendezvous, refuelling and launch
capabilities but not a vehicle assembly capability. During this
period, it will be little more than an interim assembly of fuel
tanks and other hardware in orbit. Personnel involved in its
operation will utilise their earth-to-orbit-to-earth vehicle as
living quarters for the duration of their stay in orbit. Until
an orbital station is developed to a higher order of operational
autonomy in support of this and perhaps other operations, it
will be under the immediate operational control of the
terrestrial launch site.
Throughout the operation, assembly of equipment in orbit must be
directed toward the eventual establishment of more sophisticated
orbital stations. As indicated previously, an early improved
station may be constructed from 22 vehicle shells. Prior to any
expansion of lunar outpost operations, sufficient tankage will
have been placed in orbit to permit construction of two or three
such stations. Having more than one station in orbit enhances
future operational capability and flexibility by increasing
number of possible firing times per month.
Although it is considered premature in this preliminary
feasibility study to establish an exact schedule for assembly of
more sophisticated orbital stations, the operational requirement
must be recognised now. Some considerations which affect
implementation of this requirement are that:
No other program is likely to
make available a similar amount of material, in orbit,
without a previously established purpose.
The demands of this program will
use a considerable fraction of foreseeable or predictable
large booster resources.
The economy of using otherwise
wasted resources to a constructive end.
Early attainment of more advanced
operational capability in the orbital station will contribute to
other space activities as well as to this specific operation.
Examples of such contributions are:
acclimatisation, and training capability for personnel.
Space laboratory for equipment.
Materiel storage space.
Earth surveillance (perhaps a
security consideration in this specific operation).
Survey/geodesy data collection.
Instrumentation for test of
earth-to-space weapon effects.
As the scope of operations at the
orbital station increase, so will the interactions with other
national space activities increase. Therefore, it can be
expected to evolve into an independent agency supporting this
terrestrial launch site, and possibly others.
4. Lunar Outpost
This goal of the project is envisioned as falling into
several basic areas as follows:
Life Support and Preliminary
In the first outpost phase, lasting from 30 to 90 days,
concern of those landed revolves primarily about life
support and the human verification of many details of
information previously generated by unmanned satellites or
probes. Permanent site selection will also depend upon such
During the second outpost phase, we find personnel and
cargo located in the vicinity of the permanent site capable
of constructing habitable structures. There will be a
rotation of personnel during this phase which will last
approximately 18 months. Minimum tour will not be more than
one year. The head of the outpost during this period will be
one whose primary speciality is construction.
Beneficial Occupancy and Initial Operational Capability
This it the goal for Project HORIZON as set forth in
this study. The outpost at this point can comfortably
support 12 men, six of whom will spend a large part of their
time in general maintenance and life support.
These volumes have focused on the goal
of establishing a lunar outpost capable of supporting 12 people.
This represents a large capital expenditure. Once established, the
cost is shown decreasing as a result of eliminating the capital
expenditure and continuing only the life support resupply. In order
to realize a full return on the investment involved, it will
obviously be desired to establish additional equipment at the
outpost in quantity. For example, the use of the moon as a launching
site for manned or unmanned planetary expeditions will be highly
desirable. As such requirements multiply it is obvious that
construction, equipment, and personnel requirements will also
There exists an immediate requirement, therefore, to initiate an
early industrialized expansion of the outpost giving it a capability
of self-regeneration, to the greatest extent possible, from
materials at hand. Each returning vehicle will bring physical and
biological materials and samples back for analysis. Each sample must
be critically analyzed to determine its utility. Methods must then
be determined and equipment transported to the lunar outpost which
will contribute to a self-regenerative capability. During this
secondary expansion /construction period, the operational outpost
will acquire an industrial self-regenerative capability and
capabilities will evolve which manifestly justify the entire effort.
In addition, this nation will be in the position of having
contributed in an early and timely manner to the extension of man's
B. ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL
As indicated earlier, it is expected that the terrestrial
launch site and the orbital station will have applications in
both R&D and operational activities of other projects. The
potential scientific applications of the lunar outpost cover a
broad spectrum of activities.
The scope of activities which must occur at the locations of the
essential elements of this specific operation call for a full
range of support including military, technical R&D; civilian
(NASA) scientific research; operational logistics; operational
space activity. This involves full Military Air Transport
Service and Military Sea Transportation Service type support
plus possibly civil air lift and merchant marine. One or more of
there requirements, will overlap assigned missions of major
existing unified commands extending over broad geographical
There will be requirements for support from and to other
elements of government. Such requirements will affect both
technical and operational elements of any organization set up
for the accomplishment of this specific mission. One case, in
point, is support of NASA scientific programs. Examples of other
support or guidance requirements from or to governmental
departments other than Defense are at follows:
Operations Co-ordinating Board,
National Security Council; overall inter-departmental
Central Intelligence Agency,
National Security Council; National Intelligence
Department of State; relations
with other interested nations
Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Department of Justice; security matters
U. S. Coast Guard Geodetic
Survey, Department of Commerce; survey and geodesy
U. S. Geological Survey.
Department of the Interior; selenology
Some would have special
responsibilities and delegated authorities peculiar to their
particular operational situation. For example, the launch site
may have major responsibilities in inter-departmental operations
approaching that of one of the existing National Missile Ranges;
the orbital station may have a major communications
responsibility to the entire project, etc.
Both the project management and terrestrial launch site will
require a full range of conventional and space-peculiar
operational technical support. Technical support at the launch
site must have the capability of cross service support to
military and civil departments of government. Technical channels
of communication should prevail on technical matters without
abrogating or diluting responsibility.
3. Staff Organization
As previously noted, a full range of technical staffing and
support is required. However, special mission-peculiar
operational requirements exist and must be clearly identified
and treated in future planning documents. It must be recognized
that all Planning factors for an operation of this magnitude and
significance are not firm, particularly during the early stages
of feasibility demonstration and for the operational as opposed
to the purely technical.
At least in the early stages of operation of the orbital station
and the lunar outpost, a different staffing pattern will
prevail. Individuals must have a wide range of carefully
selected skills. While this poses no insurmountable problems, it
does require very careful co-ordination in all phases of
operation from first concept approval until expansion of
operations to a considerable degree at some yet undetermined
The preceding discussions suggest that early activation,
staffing and training of the various agencies is mandatory. Full
optimum, most-economical operations will result from a carefully
planned activation program. Waiting until the full requirement
is imminent would, in any given instance, delay or hazard some
facet of operations.
(S) CHAPTER IV:
NON-TECHNICAL SUPPORTING CONSIDERATIONS
From the viewpoint of
national security, the primary implication of the feasibility of
establishment of a lunar outpost is the importance of being first.
Clearly, we cannot exercise an option between peaceful and military
applications unless we are first.
For political and psychological reasons, anything short of being
first on the lunar surface would be catastrophic. Being first will
have so much political significance that no one can say at this time
what the absolute effects will be. However, it is apparent from past
space accomplishments that being second again cannot be tolerated.
Any new venture of the
magnitude of this study creates an immediate requirement for both
general and specific policy guidance. Policy is a product of times
and circumstances. Man's experience in space matters is short, and
the circumstances of his space activities are extensions of all the
complex relations which preceded them. Accordingly, we have not
evolved a comprehensive body of even controversial, much less agreed
Both the Executive and the Legislative branches of the United States
Government have devoted considerable attention to the subject for
approximately one and one-half years. The policy which has evolved
from Legislative or Executive action is still quite general. No
specific policy directed at the subject of this study was found.
An effort has been made to analyse existing general policy and to
summarise it in a form suitable act background for this study. That
summary is in Appendix A. There has been no conscious effort at
abstraction of points of policy pertinent only to this subject.
Rather, the effort was to summarise the general policy. This subject
will require an early and continuing effort at immediate
development, correlation, and codification of policy.
For the present, then, the policy, as the requirements, must be
judged against the background of contemporary international
political and military situations. The general policy, however, is
sufficiently clear in stating the urgency of the situation.
The intelligence estimates which support statements of national
policy credit the Soviet Union with a capability of accomplishing
the objectives of this study any time after 1965. Therefore, we may
infer a requirement from national policy.
C. POLITICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
1. Political and Psychological
The political and psychological implications of our failure
to be first in space are a matter of public record. This failure
has reflected adversely on United States military, scientific,
and political leadership. To some extent we have recovered the
loss. However, once having been second best in the eyes of the
world's population, we are not now in a position to afford being
second on any other major step in space. We have already
stretched our luck in being second with the space probe and sun
satellite. However, the political implications of the space
activities accomplished to date have not been nearly as serious
as those which will result from failure to be first in this
The results of failure to first place man on extra-terrestrial,
naturally-occurring, real estate will raise grave political
questions and at the same time lower United States prestige and
influence in dealing with this and related problems. The Soviet
Union have announced openly its intention that some of its
citizens will celebrate the 50th anniversary of the present
government (1967) on the lunar surface. The United States
intelligence community agrees that the Soviet Union may
accomplish a manned lunar landing at any time after 1965.
Judging from past experience, it is easy to visualise all manner
of political and legal implications which the Soviet Union might
postulate as a result of such a successful accomplishment. As is
so often the care in points of law, the effect is the derivative
of the precedent.
There are possibly other applications of space which will permit
earlier derivation of meaningful military capabilities than will
a successful lunar outpost provided these applications are
pursued vigorously. Individually, however, they will not have
the same political impact.
In the still vague body of fact and thought on the subject,
world opinion may be expected to view the other applications
similar to actions on the high seas and also to view the
establishment of a first lunar outpost as similar to proprietary
rights derived from first occupancy. As the Congress has noted,
we are caught in a stream in which we have no choice but to
proceed. Our success depends strongly on the decisiveness with
which we exercise our current options. The lunar outpost is the
most immediate such case. It is the basis for others more
far-reaching such as further inter-planetary exploration
More detailed coverage of legal and political implications may
be found in Appendix B. They are directly related to policy
discussions in Appendix A.
2. National Security
Volume II of this study indicates that it has the objective
of treating the subject up to and including the establishment
and maintenance of a twelve-man outpost of which approximately
fifty percent (six men) would have the continued functions of
life support operations. This would include operation and
maintenance of equipment with perhaps minor technical
improvements in the outpost. While it may be granted that this
achievement will have been a major national accomplishment from
the political and diplomatic viewpoint and will provide the
know-how for expansion, it will not satisfy all of the
foreseeable national security requirements. It is, therefore,
merely a point of departure for security considerations.
The total extent of the military applications, which may evolve
after the establishment of the initial outpost, is a function of
variables which require operational and/or technical evaluation
beyond the scope of this study. Some entail National Security
Council. type evaluation. Examples are:
Evaluation of the actual or
potential threat to the continued operation of the outpost
and policy on countering the threat. This must include a
study of interactions with other space activities.
Evaluation of the significance
of lunar operations within the broader framework of the
total national defence.
Military evaluation of the
operational and technical requirements to implement any
National Security Council policies which are specified.
Cost of implementing military
operational and technical requirements.
Utilisation of knowledge gained
during first phases of outpost operation
Extent to which national policy
requires attainment of specific military or scientific
State-of-the-art improvement in
rocket booster engines, particularly in specific impulse,
thrust, and weight.
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